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Civil Procedure
Henry G. McMahon*
PARTIES
In Teamsters Local Union No. 5 v. Tasty Baking Co.,' the
plaintiff labor union sought injunctive relief against the alleged
breach by the defendant of the provisions of a labor contract.
A temporary restraining order obtained on the ex parte applica-
tion of the plaintiff was dissolved on motion of the defendant,
on the ground that an unincorporated association has no pro-
cedural capacity to sue.2 When plaintiff sought an appeal, the
trial court refused to grant it on the ground that no final,
appealable judgment could be rendered until after the trial of
the case on its merits. Under supervisory writs, the Supreme
Court ordered the trial court to grant an appeal to the proper
appellate court. The technical validity of the trial court's posi-
tion was recognized by the Supreme Court, but it held that, since
a trial of the case on its merits could only result in a judgment
of dismissal based on the same grounds as for the dissolution
of the restraining order, the appeal should be granted im-
mediately.
The rules on the subject of indispensable parties were ap-
plied in an expropriation proceeding where the sole defendant
owned only a half interest in the property sought to be ex-
propriated, and the usufruct of the other half owned by his
children. The latter were held to be indispensable parties to
the proceeding, and the appellate court remanded the case to
permit the joinder of the children.3
The same results would obtain under the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure. 4 In the new Code, however, the completely dif-
ferent subjects of necessary parties and indispensable parties
are kept distinct, and the rules which apply to each are set forth
clearly.5 In the great majority of Louisiana cases, including the
*Professor and sometime dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 239 La. 15, 117 So.2d 829 (1960).
2. Cf. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 689 (1960).
3. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Derouen, 239 La. 467, 118 So.2d 889
(1960).
4. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 641, 646 (1960).
5. See id. arts. 641-647.
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one now being reviewed, these two subjects are confused by
treating the two terms as being synonymous.
PLEADINGS
Exceptions
The defendant, in Hungerford v. Hungerford,8 pleaded excep-
tions to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae and
ratione materiae together, without pleading the former first and
the other in the alternative, and with full reservation of all of
his rights under the first. The trial court, following the Garig
case, 7 held that defendant had thereby waived his exception to
the jurisdiction ratione personae by pleading it with his excep-
tion to the jurisdiction ratione materiae. The Supreme Court
granted supervisory writs to review this ruling of the trial
judge; but, after a hearing, recalled its writs and followed the
Garig case.
The Hungerfor'd case was decided prior to the legislative
adoption of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. In a con-
curring opinion, Mr. Justice McCaleb expressed a reluctance to
follow the hypertechnical subtlety of the Garig case, pointed out
that it would be overruled by the proposed new Code,8 and ex-
pressed the hope that the latter would be duly adopted. The
learned Justice's hope was realized just three days before the
Supreme Court refused a rehearing in the Hungerford case;
although, of course, the effective date of the new Code was post-
poned until January 1, 1961.
The Reconventional Demand
Two cases during the past term, decided quite correctly by
the Supreme Court under the rules of the Code of Practice,
illustrate the need for the changes in the procedural law regu-
6. 240 La. 24, 121 So.2d 226 (1960).
7. George W. Garig Transfer, Inc. v. Harris, 226 La. 117, 75 So.2d 28 (1954),
15 LouISIANA LAW REviEw 849 (1955).
8. By LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 925 (1960), which provides that two
or more objections, such as improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, lack of jurisdiction over subject matter, are pleaded in the declina-
tory exception, these objections "need not be pleaded in the alternative or in any
particular order."
A similar scuttling of the "sacred order" rule of the Garg case is effected by
id. art. 928, which requires the pleading of the declinatory and dilatory exceptions
at the same time. This article provides that "these exceptions need not be pleaded
in the alternative or in a particular order."
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lating the reconventional demand which have been made by the
new Code.
The Supreme Court's refusal to dismiss the appeal in Jones
v. Jones' Estate9 is not based on grounds sufficiently noteworthy
to warrant discussion here. What is important for present pur-
poses is the Code of Practice rule, presented obliquely in the
Jones case, that a reconventional demand must either be con-
nected with or related to the main demand, when both of the
parties reside in the same parish. This limitation has been re-
moved by the new Code, which has abolished the former re-
quirements of either connexity or diversity of residence, and
now permits the defendant to reconvene against the plaintiff on
any cause of action. 10
Johnson v. Wilson" primarily involves factual issues, but
one point of law squarely decided by the Supreme Court merits
attention here. This case involved an intersectional collision,
which each party alleged was due to the negligence of the other.
A trial court jury rendered verdicts which rejected the plain-
tiff's demand for damages, and awarded damages to the defend-
ant under his reconventional demand. The case was affirmed
by the intermediate appellate court ;12 but under certiorari the
Supreme Court reversed, and held that the defendant's recon-
ventional demand was barred by his contributory negligence.
The interesting point in this case hinges on the defendant's
objections to proof of his contributory negligence on the ground
that this defense to the reconventional demand had not been
pleaded by the plaintiff. Under the jurisprudence interpreting
pertinent Code of Practice articles, 3 exceptions are not per-
mitted and an answer is not required in reconvention. 14 These
rules, quite proper under the Code of Practice, are based on the
theory that exceptions and an answer to a reconventional de-
mand are replicatory pleadings. Actually they are not, since
they are pleaded to the new demand which the defendant has
injected into the case; and these pleadings would serve the same
function in the reconventional demand as they serve in any other
incidental action.
9. 238 La. 309, 115 So.2d 361 (1959).
10. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1061 (1960).
11. 239 La. 390, 118 So.2d 450 (1960).
12. Johnson v. Wilson, 97 So.2d 674 (La. App. 1957).
13. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 329, 375 (1870).
14. See Loew's, Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 237 La. 132, 110 So.2d 553 (1959),
and cases cited therein.
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The facts of the Johnson case illustrate these points. The
decision of the Supreme Court is based on the procedural rules
that responsive pleadings to a reconventional demand are un-
necessary; and that every defense to a reconventional demand,
factual or legal, is considered as pleaded by effect of law. Yet
the same reasons which require a defendant to plead the af-
firmative defense of contributory negligence particularly should
require the same plea of a defendant in reconvention.
The new Code permits exceptions, and requires an answer, to
be filed to a reconventional demand.' 5
DiscovERY
State v. Buckman' presented an interesting application of
one section of the Depositions and Discovery Act.17 On ex parte
motion in an expropriation proceeding, the trial court had or-
dered the plaintiff to produce its written contracts with, and
instructions to, the real estate experts plaintiff had employed
to estimate just compensation for the property taken. Under
supervisory writs, the Supreme Court ordered the trial court
to vacate this order. This action appears justified by the plain
language of the statutory provision. Since the defendant had
not shown "that denial of production and inspection [of these
documents] would unfairly prejudice [it] in preparing [its
claim] or will cause [it] undue hardship or injustice," the trial
court should not have ordered the production of these documents
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for
trial."
The first paragraph of this statutory section is based on
Rule 30 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The second
paragraph thereof, which was invoked here, was added by the
Louisiana State Law Institute to cover the situation of the
Hickman case,' 8 and to prevent the compulsory production of
the "work product" of a party's attorney, agent, or expert. This
provision has been retained in the new procedural Code. 19
15. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PIROCEDURE arts. 1034, 1035 (1960). While these rules
make no change in the procedural law with respect to the other incidental de-
mands, they definitely work a change in the rules regulating the reconventional
demand.
16. 239 La. 872, 120 So.2d 461 (1960).
17. LA. R.S. 13:3762 (1950).
18. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
19. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDuRE, art. 1452 (1960).
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ACTION OF NULLITY OF JUDGMENT
Tracy v. Dufrene20 presented a most interesting, but by no
means novel, question. There, the Supreme Court held that an
action to annul a judgment on the ground of its absolute nullity
need not be instituted in the court which rendered the judg-
ment. Under the settled jurisprudence, the Code of Practice
rule21 that the action of nullity must be instituted in the court
which rendered the judgment was held applicable only to actions
to annul voidable judgments, and not to those asserting their
absolute nullity.
The same rule obtains under the new procedural Code.22
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court again filled its quota of cases transferred
to the intermediate appellate courts because of the failure of
the record to establish affirmatively the appellate jurisdiction
of the transferring court.23 The cases transferred are of im-
portance now only to the legal historian. The recent appellate
reorganization has ended, once and for all, this enormous waste
of professional and judicial energies.
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The rules of appellate procedure applied in the cases decided
by the Supreme Court during the past term make an interesting
comparison with those contained in the new procedural Code.
In Succession of Franz,24 an executor was permitted to appeal
from a judgment insofar as it was unfavorable to him, despite
the fact that he had accepted payment of the portion of the
20. 240 La. 232, 121 So.2d 843 (1960).
21. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 608 (1870).
22. See Comments under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 2002, 2006
(1960).
23. See McBride v. McBride, 238 La. 270, 115 So.2d 346 (1959); Nolen v.
Bennett, 238 La. 364, 115 So.2d 381 (1959) ; Katz v. Singerman, 238 La. 915,
117 So.2d 56 (1960) ; Talbert v. Tyler, 239 La. 1, 117 So.2d 824 (1960) ; Suc-
cession of Williams, 239 La. 21, 117 So.2d 832 (1960); Burr v. McCaleb, 239
La. 80, 117 So.2d 918 (1960) ; Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 239 La.
116, 118 So.2d 124 (1960) ; State v. Orleans Parish School Board, 239 La. 224,
118 So.2d 127 (1960); Ralph's Fleet, Inc. v. American Marine Corp., 239 La.
435, 118 So.2d 877 (1960); Food Town, Inc. v. Town of Plaquemine, 239 La.
439, 118 So.2d 879 (1960) ; Caswell v. Hoft, 239 La. 503, 119 So.2d 94 (1960) ;
Buras v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 239 La. 721, 119 So.2d 839 (1960) ; Eskine
v. Brown, 239 La. 729, 119 So.2d 842 (1960) ; and Williams v. Thompson, 240
La. 243, 121 So.2d 847 (1960).
24. 238 La. 608, 116 So.2d 267 (1959).
19611
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
judgment in his favor. Under the new Code, "acquiescence in
part of a divisible judgment or in a favorable part of an in-
divisible judgment does not preclude an appeal as to other parts
of such judgment." 25
Two cases presented a question concerning the appeal bond.
In one, 26 the appellee moved to dismiss a suspensive appeal on
the ground that the bond furnished therefor was insufficient
in amount. The motion to dismiss was overruled under an ap-
plication of the jurisprudential rule that a complaint as to the
validity or sufficiency of an appeal bond must be urged in the
trial court. The same rule is enunciated in the new Code.27 In
the second case, 2 the Supreme Court held that the Insurance
Commissioner, who appealed from a judgment rendered against
him in his capacity of ancillary receiver of a foreign insurance
company in liquidation, as a state official was exempt by stat-
ute29 from the necessity of furnishing bond. This statute has
not been affected in any way by the adoption of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and will continue to govern future cases.
The appeals in two cases3° were dismissed because the record
of appeal was not filed timely, under the Code of Practice rules1
that the appellant has the duty of filing this record in the Su-
preme Court. This harsh result is eliminated as far as it can
be under the new Code. If the appellant pays the necessary fees
timely to the clerk of the trial court, it is the latter's duty in all
cases to transmit the record to the appellate court; and no appeal
will be dismissed because of the clerk's failure to file it timely.82
Under the Code of Practice rule, 33 an answer to an appeal
must be filed within three days before the date assigned for
argument in the appellate court, if the appellee seeks any modi-
fication of the judgment appealed from. In one case,3 4 the
Supreme Court refused to consider an answer to an appeal which
25. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2085 (1960).
20. Schwarz v. Friedenberg, 239 La. 427, 118 So.2d 875 (1960).
27. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 2088, 5123 (1960).
28. State v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of New York, 238 La. 372, 115 So.2d
384 (1959).
29. See LA. R.S. 13:4521 (1950) and Natalbany Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Tax
Commission, 175 La. 110, 143 So. 20 (1932).
30. Coney v. Coney, 238 La. 410, 115 So.2d 801 (1959) ; Id., 238 La. 418, 115
So.2d 803 (1959).
31. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 587 (1870).
32. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2127 (1960). See also, to the same
effect: LA. R.S. 13:4445 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 38, § 1.
33. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 890 (1870).
34. Evans v. Evans, 238 La. 963, 117 So.2d 73 (1960).
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was not filed on or before this date. The result would be the
same under the new Code. In fact, the latter has a much stricter
rule: an answer to an appeal must be filed "not later than fifteen
days after the return day or the lodging of the record, whichever
is later. '85
EXECUTORY PROCESS
In Spiro v. Richardson,6 the Supreme Court applied the
settled rule that injunction will lie to restrict the enforcement
of a mortgage in an executory proceeding to the amount of the
mortgage indebtedness. None of the articles of the new Code
expressly enunciate this rule, but the redactors' official com-
ments indicate no intent to recommend any legislative change on
this point, and a liberal construction of either of two of the
articles on executory process would certainly support this rule. 7
SUCCESSION PROCEDURE
A novel, and quite interesting, question of succession pro-
cedure was decided in Sun Oil Co. v. Roger 8 This was a con-
cursus proceeding involving the ownership of oil royalties de-
posited into the registry of the trial court, and where the validity
of a succession sale of immovable property was challenged by
some of the heirs of the deceased. The property had been sold
at public auction to pay the debts and charges of the succession.
The co-administrators of the succession, on whose petition the
property had been sold, were a daughter of the deceased and
her husband. The property was purchased by this daughter.
One group of heirs claimed title to the property through this
succession sale; the other group asserted the absolute nullity of
this sale, and contended that the ownership of the property re-
mained vested in all of the heirs of the deceased.
The principal contention of this latter group of heirs, and
the only point which warrants consideration here, was that title
to the property so purchased would have vested in the com-
munity existing between the co-administrators, and since the
35. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2133 (1960). This change was made
to insure adequate briefing of all issues to be presented to the appellate court,
including those raised by an answer to the appeal.
36. 240 La. 192, 121 So.2d 741 (1960).
37. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 2752, 2753(1) (1960).
38. 239 La. 379, 118 So.2d 446 (1960).
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husband was prohibited by law 39 from purchasing any of the
property of the succession, the sale was an absolute nullity. In
a carefully considered opinion by the Chief Justice, the court
pointed out that since the wife was an heir of the deceased, she
could have validly purchased the property, and the technicality
that her purchase might be considered for the benefit of the
community would not affect the validity of the purchase. Both
the holding and the reasoning of the appellate court appear
completely sound. As an heir of the deceased, the wife had a
right to protect her interest by purchasing the property to pre-
vent its sacrifice. Whether the funds used for this purpose
were her paraphernal funds under her own administration, or
whether the money or credit used to purchase the property were
supplied by the community or a third person, was of no concern
to either the other heirs or the creditors of the succession. The
substantive law governing the community of acquets and gains
are rules of accounting between husband and wife. Third per-
sons have no juridical interest to invoke these rules except to
prevent double recovery, or to prevent fraud if they are either
forced heirs or creditors of husband or wife.40
Unfortunately, the same result may not obtain under the new
procedural Code. In the articles thereof41 which replace the
basic Civil Code articles invoked here,42 the right of an heir to
purchase succession property has not been preserved. The writer
can think of no reason for such a change, and from the redactors'
official comments it would appear that it is the result of an
inadvertence. 43 The matter will be called to the attention of the
Louisiana State Law Institute for appropriate recommendation.
ACTIONS FOR DIVORCE OR SEPARATION
Some idea of the general improvement of the adjective law
through the adoption of the new Code can be gleaned from a
comparison of the rules applied in recent cases on this subject
with those provided by the Code of Civil Procedure.
Davis v. Davis4 4 held that a jury trial may be had in an
39. Under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1146 (1870), repealed by La. Acts 1960, No.
30, § 2.
40. On this point, see Comment (b) under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art.
686 (1960).
41. Id. arts. 3194, 3195 (1960).
42. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1146 (1870), repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 2.
43. See Comments under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3194, 3195
(1960).
44. 238 La. 293, 115 So.2d 355 (1959).
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action for a divorce; but the court was careful to hold that the
issues of the custody of minor children and alimony for their
support were not triable before a jury. The decision, though
unfortunate, appears to be correct, since the Code of Practice
expressly allows jury trial in all civil cases except those excluded,
and no provision of positive law excludes a trial by jury in
divorce or separation cases. 45
This rule is both a historical accident and a judicial anomaly.
Under Anglo-American law, divorce and separation cases fell
within the jurisdiction of the courts of chancery, where trial
by jury was not available. The possibility of jury trial in di-
vorce and separation cases is probably the result of the failure
of the Livingston Committee in 1824 even to contemplate such
a possibility. The fact that this privilege was not claimed for
more than a century and a quarter thereafter would appear to
indicate that the members of the legal profession did not regard
this as a possibility for a very long period. The new procedural
Code expressly prohibits trial by jury in such cases.4 1
Twice during the past term, the Supreme Court very prop-
erly held that there could be no suspensive appeal from a judg-
ment insofar as it awarded custody of minor children to one of
the spouses. 47 There is no change in the rule under the new
Code.48
Three times during the past term, the Supreme Court recog-
nized and applied the rule that a suspensive appeal may be taken
from a judgment of the trial court awarding alimony.49 In
Lodatto v. Lodatto,50 a very able but quite unsuccessful effort
was made to overturn this rule, insofar as it permitted a sus-
pensive appeal from an order awarding alimony pendente lite.
This rule is another historical accident; but, unfortunately, it is
more far-reaching, and much more serious, than the one per-
mitting jury trial in divorce or separation cases. This rule may
force a dependent wife to borrow money to support herself and
her children, or throw them upon public or private charity if
borrowing is not possible. It has been in effect for a long period
45. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 494, 756, 757, 1036 (1870).
46. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1733(3) (1960).
47. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 239 La. 500, 118 So.2d 901 (1960) ; Labat v.
Gautreaux, 239 La. 760, 119 So.2d 853 (1960).
48. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3943 (1960).
49. Lodatto v. Lodatto, 238 La. 305, 115 So.2d 359 (1959) ; Randle v. Randle,
239 La. 646, 119 So.2d 495 (1960) ; Lavigne v. Schneider, 240 La. 93, 121 So.2d
498 (1960).
50. 238 La. 305, 115 So.2d 359 (1959).
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of time, and has been condemned repeatedly and continuously by
professional opinion. Yet this has been a situation, as Mark
Twain once observed about the weather, where everybody talked
about it but nobody seemed to do anything about it. The new
procedural Code has done something about it: a suspensive ap-
peal from a judgment awarding alimony is expressly pro-
hibited.51
MISCELLANEOUS
Martin v. Mud Supply Co.5 2 probably was the closest case
decided by the Supreme Court during the past term, and must
have been one of the most difficult to decide. This writer has
read all of the various reported opinions a number of times,
and concludes each reading of an opinion in complete agreement
with its author, only to reverse the process when the next opin-
ion is read.
In the instant case, the mother of a young man killed in an
automobile accident sued to recover damages for wrongful death
against the defendant, the employer of the negligent operator
of the car in which the deceased was riding at the time of the
accident. The defense was a denial of the allegation that the
negligent operator was an employee of the defendant; and an
alternative plea that if he was, he was acting without the course
and scope of his employment in inviting the deceased to ride
with him without the knowledge and consent of the defendant.
Thereafter, but more than a year after the fatal accident, the
plaintiff amended her petition and sought to make the defend-
ant's liability insurer a defendant, relying upon the omnibus
clause of the policy.
After a trial on the merits, the plaintiff's demand against
the owner of the vehicle was rejected, and this judgment was
affirmed on appeal.53 This holding precluded any argument that
prescription against the insurer was interrupted by the suit
against the original defendant, his solidary co-debtor. Under
these circumstances, the plaintiff argued that the owner of the
insured vehicle had been sued timely; that the insurer had
knowledge of this fact, having defended the suit through its
own attorneys; and that, therefore, this notice of the plaintiff's
demand interrupted prescription against the insurer.
51. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDUIJE art. 3943 (1960).
52. 239 La. 616, 119 So.2d 484 (1960).
53. Martin v. Mud Supply Co., 111 So.2d 375 (La. App. 1959).
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The trial court, the intermediate appellate court,5 4 and the
majority of the Supreme Court on rehearing, rejected this con-
tention. Each of these courts recognized the rule that prescrip-
tion is interrupted by notice of the plaintiff's demand brought to
the debtor in any legal capacity, but held that a broadening of
this rule so as to apply to the facts of the case would be unwar-
ranted.
With some doubts, and without any strong feeling in the mat-
ter, this writer reluctantly expresses his agreement with the ma-
jority holding.
Tucker v. New Orleans Laundries, Inc.,5 was a shareholder's
derivative action56 to recover judgment in favor of a corporation
against a number of its officers, because of the latter's alleged
fraud and manipulation. The trial court dismissed the suit by
sustaining exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action. On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed
from, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The judgments successfully pleaded in the trial court as res
judicata were two rendered in the federal courts in shareholders'
derivative actions involving the same subject matter, and several
judgments in suits brought by the plaintiffs individually against
the officers of the corporation. The federal shareholder's deriva-
tive actions had been dismissed because of the courts' lack of
jurisdiction, and the nonjoinder of an indispensable party. In
view of these facts, the Supreme Court held that neither of these
judgments were definitive, and hence neither precluded further
action to compel the corporation to enforce its rights. The share-
holders' individual suits had been dismissed because they sought
to enforce rights which belonged to the corporation, and not to
the latter's shareholders; and hence none precluded the instant
suit.
Under the numerous and complicated allegations of the peti-
tions, the Supreme Court held that a cause of action had been
stated.
54. Ibid.
55. 238 La. 207, 114 So.2d 866 (1959).
56. The rules regulating the procedure in a shareholder's derivative action are
set forth in LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 591-597, 611 (1960).
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